Strange Events May Be Brewing and Honduras is Their Focus.

First published at BlogCritics on 9 July 2009

Mediation of the Honduran Situation by President Arias May Well be a Good thing.

The selection of Costa Rican President Arias to mediate the dispute between former Honduran President Zelaya and the Government of interim President Micheletti appears to have been a wise one. It may be useful to speculate a bit about why and by whom President Arias was selected, as well as about the likely impact of these things on the power of Venezuelan President Chávez in Latin America.

The possible role of President Arias as a mediator was suggested to Zelaya during his 7 July Washington meeting with Secretary Clinton, and Zelaya agreed to it. Secretary Clinton promptly telephoned President Arias to ask for his help and he agreed. However, her's was not the only contact with President Arias regarding the Honduran situation: he had been asked the day before by Honduran interim President Micheletti to consider playing such a role. I am unaware of any reports indicating that Chávez had sought Arias' selection, and the United States Government has said nothing to indicate that it has been in discussions with the interim Government of Honduras; it seems not to have been.

Zelaya and Micheletti went to Costa Rica as contemplated, and are to meet separately with Arias. Their positions, at least for now, are unchanged: Zelaya says he must be reinstated and Micheletti says that's out of the question. As I suggested in the linked article, this may prevent, or at least postpone, a military confrontation between the Honduran military and forces from other countries, principally Chávez ally, Nicaragua.

During the 1980s, President Arias played a substantial role in efforts to decrease the influence of the United States over much of Latin America and to bring some measure of stability to the region. He received a Nobel Peace Prize in 1987 for doing so. However, President Arias is not very chummy with Chávez. During his barely successful campaign for reelection as President of Costa Rica in 2006, Arias' principal opponent was Ottón Solis, much favored by Chávez.

Things seem to be happening behind—but not all that far behind—the curtain. On 7 July, the same day that she met with Zelaya and telephoned President Arias, Secretary Clinton submitted to an interview by Globovisión. The interview was at the State Department in Washington. Globovisión, one of the very few broadcast outlets in Venezuela still able to criticize the Chávez government, has been under vigorous attack by that Government, and may soon be closed; its principals are under criminal charges. Here are comments by a blogger in Venezuela, who does not much care for Chávez:

Questions were standard and Hillary responses standard . . . Still, she made it clear that things in Venezuela are not kosher and that she is aware of it.
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No matter what, the interview does not solve anything, does not protect Globovisión from being closed though it makes very clear that the price Chavez will have to pay for it will be very high. Interestingly, the Honduras part . . . revealed how irrelevant Venezuela will become as negotiations keep going.
***
As soon as the interview was over I switched to VTV to watch La Hojilla reaction. I was not disappointed as Mario Silva was livid, as furious as I ever saw him. . . . Proving that the interview hit a raw nerve. The top was Silva belching "who named Arias?" betraying his resentment at 1) his boss not being on the forefront anymore and 2) that Arias did the most to block a commie takeover of Central America 20 years ago.

According to Alberto Federico Ravell, head of Globovisión, interviewed on 8 July in Miami as he returned to Venezuela from Washington, he is convinced that

Clinton supports Globovisión's efforts to speak out against Hugo Chávez's government. . . .In every thing she said I was seeing a red beret . . . .It was incredible that the same day she met with ousted Honduran President Zelaya, she also met with representatives from a television channel that is seen by Chávez as part of the opposition.

I think that the full transcript of the Clinton interview confirms that she was, indeed, talking about Chávez, whose media censorship continues unabated. A somewhat different take on the interview is provided here. If, as claimed in that article, Secretary Clinton wanted to "to lower the temperature" in the United States' relations with Venezuela, neither her Globovisión appearance itself, nor statements such as these may have been the best way to go about it:

Clinton said that what the White House hopes to see "over the next months in Venezuela is a recognition that you can be a very strong leader and have very strong opinions without trying to take on too much power and trying to silence all your critics."

"So I think there are ways that the current government in Venezuela could maintain a very strong presence without, in any way, raising questions about the commitment to democracy," the secretary said.

A reminder to viewers of the television station which Chávez is about to close that he shouldn't silence all his critics could hardly have been warmly received by Chávez.

Zelaya's attempt to amend the Honduran Constitution to eliminate the presidential term limit, and later his attempt to return to Honduras, had been vigorously supported by Chávez, who had supplied the aircraft in which he attempted to return to Honduras. It has been reported that Chávez was simultaneously on the telephone with Zelaya, Ortega of Nicaragua and Fidel Castro of Cuba during Zelaya's aborted flight to Honduras. It seems obvious that Chávez's standing in Latin America would have been enhanced by a spectacularly bloody reception of the former President on 6 July, and that it has been diminished by the failure of Zelaya's return and by the selection of President Arias as a mediator.

Despite Chávez's apparent earlier successes in helping to create the Constitutional crisis in Honduras and in pushing the UN, the OAS and ALBA to make it worse, things were not going entirely as he might have wished.

* Shortly before Zelaya's attempted return, several members of the OAS—an organization dominated by Chávez and his allies-- apparently tried to dissuade Zelaya from making the attempt.

* Argentine President Kirchner was one of the dignitaries who flew to El Salvador and thence to Nicaragua to be with Zelaya following his attempt to enter Honduras. Her Peronista party had lost very badly in Argentina's 28 June congressional elections, and her husband resigned as the head of the Peronista party on 30 June; Chávez had been among the principal supporters of their party.

* The current President of Panama in June won a decisive victory with more than sixty percent of the vote over his opponent, a big Chávez supporter. During his inauguration address he announced, "As president, I will do everything within my reach to advance the ideals of a free economy, challenging the different ideological pendulum that Latin America has."

Nor are things going well for Chávez domestically. Here is a link to an article I wrote about that just over a month ago.

Hope perhaps springs eternal, and I may have too much of it. Still, during the days immediately after the "coup" in Honduras, Secretary Clinton's State Department seemed to be at least marginally less supportive of Zelaya's position than was President Obama. At a 30 June State Department briefing, it was stated that "it’s not up to us to determine what’s in line with the [Honduran] constitution." President Obama was quoted, at about the same time, as saying that the weekend ouster of Zelaya was a "not legal" coup and that Zelaya remains the country's president. These statements can be read to suggest a difference of opinion.

According to an article in Power Line by an author with whom I frequently agree, and with whom I very much agree on the nature of the Honduran "coup,"

Obama's position on Honduras is part of an emerging, and very sad, pattern. His bogus catchphrases may vary ("meddling," "illegal," or whatever), but the result always seems to be the same. Whether the venue is Honduras, Russia, or Iran, Obama instinctively sides, in the first instance, with the enemies of freedom and the rule of law. And it doesn't hurt at all if that party is also hostile towards the U.S.

I don't know whether Secretary Clinton's interview on Globovisión was cleared by President Obama. However, her appearance on a Venezuelan television station sufficiently at odds with Chávez that it is likely to be thrown off the air soon, and in the course of the interview to appear to challenge Chávez's silencing of his critics—was certainly a major step. It was one which I suspect would ordinarily have had to be approved by the President. Might these things at least hint that President Obama may yet see that Chávez et al are not the sort of friends he or the United States want? Or might they indicate that Secretary Clinton is looking for a graceful exit from the Obama administration ostensibly over foreign policy? She is a crafty person whom I don't much like, but it will be quite interesting to see what happens over the next few months.

Presidents Chávez, Obama et al Are Meddling Egregiously with Honduras.

First published by BlogCritics on 30 June 2009

The United States gave the lawfully deposed President of Honduras full support, after giving meager support to the Iranian protesters.

Over the weekend, Honduras was about to have a referendum on whether its Constitutional prohibition against a sitting president running for a second term should be modified. This referendum was proposed by President Zelaya, whose term in office expires next year; an election is to be held in November.

The Constitution expressly states that its provisions concerning the presidential term of office and prohibiting reelection are among the very few provisions not subject to change.

Title VII, with two chapters, outlines the process of amending the constitution and sets forth the principle of constitutional inviolability. The constitution may be amended by the National Congress after a two-thirds vote of all its members in two consecutive regular annual sessions. However, several constitutional provisions may not be amended. These consist of the amendment process itself, as well as provisions covering the form of government, national territory, and several articles covering the presidency, including term of office and prohibition from reelection.

The text, in Spanish, of Article VII is provided in a footnote. Despite a ruling by the Honduran Supreme Court that he could not constitutionally do so, President Zelaya determined to go forward with the referendum.

The news reports on what happened next are often unclear and frequently contradictory; to some extent, the massive media coverage of Michael Jackson's death may have displaced them. Here, however, is my best effort at offering a summary distilled from multiple sources: Sometime earlier this year, President Zelaya decided that the Constitution should be amended to permit him to run for another term. The Congress -- controlled by the party of which President Zelaya is a member -- refused to go along. The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela provided the necessary ballots, and President Zelaya ordered the military to distribute them for a referendum to be held on 28 June. The Supreme Court determined that the referendum was violative of the Constitution, and ordered the top military commander, Gen. Romeo Vásquez Velásquez, neither to distribute the ballots nor in any other way to carry out the logistics of the vote as the military would normally do in elections. General Vásquez Velásquez so advised President Zelaya, who promptly fired him. The Supreme Court ordered him reinstated, and President Zelaya refused. On 28 June, President Zelaya led a group of his followers to the military installation where the ballots were being stored, took them, and had his followers distribute them. The Congress voted unanimously to appoint a committee to analyze the situation and investigate President Zelaya for his refusal to respect the Constitution and the orders issued by other branches of government. He nevertheless carried on with his preparations, and offered only a cosmetic change to the referendum: on Saturday night (27 June), he verbally stated that the referendum would not be binding, but confirmed that it would go ahead as planned the next day. A few hours before the opening of the polling stations, the Supreme Court ordered the president’s arrest and removal from office. The army carried out the order, arrested Mr. Zelaya and transported him to Costa Rica. A reason for doing so was to avoid a bloodbath in the face of the threat of other governments interfering in Honduras’ internal affairs, among them Venezuela and Nicaragua. The likelihood of substantial popular protests over the ouster of Mr. Zelaya seemed small, since Mr. Zelaya had low support -- polls showed around 30 percent before his ouster -- "as many Hondurans were uncomfortable with his tilt to the left in a country with a long conservative, pro-Washington position." As indicated below, that bloodbath now seems quite possible, largely due to outside interference from Washington, Caracas and elsewhere. The referendum was not held, and the Legislature, in emergency session, unanimously selected its president as the interim President of Honduras as provided by Honduran law, and stated that a presidential election would be held in November, as scheduled. The interim President is of the same political party as former President Zelaya.

The ouster of President Zelaya has frequently been termed a "coup." That seems, to me at least, to stretch the word well beyond its commonly understood meaning. The Honduran military acted to execute the lawful orders of the Supreme Court and with the blessing of the "democratically elected" legislature; I have seen no indication that the military instigated the ouster. Nor is Honduras under military control; it has an interim civilian president, properly selected by unanimous vote of the legislature in compliance with the laws of presidential succession.

The United States Government was very active during the days leading up the exile of Mr. Zelaya. According to an article in the New York Times,

American officials did not believe that Mr. Zelaya’s plans for the referendum were in line with the Constitution, and were worried that it would further inflame tensions with the military and other political factions, administration officials said.

Even so, one administration official said that while the United States thought the referendum was a bad idea, it did not justify a coup.

I do not understand that it is the proper business of the United States Government to dictate to a foreign government on such matters; the decision whether another country should ignore its Constitution in order to maintain tranquility and thereby please the United States Government is not for the United States Government to make. This is particularly the case here, since the United States Government recognized that the proposed referendum was not "in line with the Constitution" and was a "bad idea."

The situation in Honduras provides an interesting comparison to the recent situation in Iran. President Chávez of Venezuela, who had expressed great solidarity with his ally, the ruling theocracy in Iran, during the recent unpleasantness there, came quickly and vigorously to the defense of one of his other allies, President Zelaya.  President Chávez said on state television that if his ambassador to Honduras were killed, or if troops entered the Venezuelan Embassy, the "military junta" would be entering a de facto state of war. Although he cited no credible evidence that these things were likely to occur, he put the armed forces of Venezuela on alert. "We will bring them down, we will bring them down, I tell you," he said, while hundreds of his supporters gathered outside Venezuela's presidential palace in solidarity with Zelaya. References to the current Honduran Government as a "military junta" were certainly erroneous; that, and characterizing the transition of power as a "coup" certainly are conducive to massive unrest. They would appear to serve no any other, legitimate, purpose. Ecuadorean President Rafael Correa, an ally of President Chávez, said that he would also support military action if Ecuador's diplomats or those of its allies were threatened.

President Obama came quickly but with slightly less vigor to Mr. Zelaya's defense as well.

"I call on all political and social actors in Honduras to respect democratic norms, the rule of law and the tenets of the Inter-American Democratic Charter," Obama said. "Any existing tensions and disputes must be resolved peacefully through dialogue free from any outside interference."

Although that doesn't sound like much interference, and in fact asserts that there should be none, it omits any mention of President Zelaya's refusal to engage in dialogue, even with the active encouragement of the United States Government. Moreover, the Obama Administration inconsistently "called for Mr. Zelaya's return to office as legitimate president of Honduras. Secretary Clinton accused Honduras of violating "the precepts of the Interamerican Democratic Charter" and said it "should be condemned by all." The Governments of the United States and of Venezuela thus supported the Honduran status quo ante; both ignored President Zelaya's defiance of Honduran law, of the Honduran Constitution, of the Honduran Supreme Court and of the Honduran Legislative branch. The new Interim President of Honduras, Roberto Micheletti said, "nobody, not Barack Obama and much less Hugo Chavez, has any right to threaten this country."

President Chávez was to meet with Mr. Zelaya in Nicaragua on 29 June. Now, Argentina's president and the head of the OAS plan to accompany Mr. Zelaya as he tries to return to Honduras. The World Bank has "paused" all program lending. Mr. Zelaya plans to speak at the United Nations on 30 June. Meanwhile, President Chávez and his friends are trying their best to cause all of the confusion and violence of which they are capable.

President Chávez had rejected the recent Iranian protests and blamed them on outside interference:

"We call on the world to respect Iran because there are attempts to undermine the strength of the Iranian revolution," said Chavez on Sunday in his weekly radio and television address.

"Ahmadinejad's triumph was a triumph all the way. They are trying to stain Ahmadinejad's triumph and through that weaken the government and the Islamic revolution. I know they will not succeed," Chavez said.

The Venezuelan Foreign Ministry also issued a statement blasting "the fierce and unfounded campaign from outside [of Iran] to discredit" Iran's president.

President Obama had tried to walk a very fine line in Iran -- too fine a line, in my opinion -- so as not to appear to "meddle" in its internal affairs.

The United States Government evidently viewed expressions of support for the Iranian protesters as meddling in internal Iranian affairs, yet it saw fit to express extraordinary support for Mr. Zelaya by demanding that Honduras  depose an interim president unanimously selected as provided for in the Honduran Constitution, and return to power a president who had sought to violate the Honduran Constitution and whose arrest had been ordered by the Supreme Court. Although President Obama called on Honduras to respect "democratic norms and the rule of law," he evidently did not mean the norms, Honduran laws and Honduran Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court of Honduras.

If it is the policy of the United States Government not to meddle in the internal affairs of other countries, there are stark differences in its treatment of the Iranian theocracy and the Government of Honduras. There are no significant differences in the treatment of the Iranian theocracy and the Government of Honduras by President Chávez of Venezuela, and I would expect none; he desires permanent and total power over Venezuela for himself, and evidently views any attempts at diminishing the power of governments sympathetic toward him as counterrevolutionary and therefore very bad. I do not think that President Obama shares such views, and certainly hope that he does not. Nevertheless, I consider the current Washington approach to the crisis in Honduras to be grossly confused.  Whatever may be President Obama's motives, I think that the United States Government made a very bad mistake in trying to upset the orderly transfer of power in Honduras.

*Article VII states, in Spanish:

CAPITULO I
DE LA REFORMA DE LA CONSTITUCIÓN

ARTICULO 373.- La reforma de esta Constitución podrá decretarse por el Congreso Nacional, en sesiones ordinarias, con dos tercios de votos de la totalidad de sus miembros. El decreto señalará al efecto el artículo o artículos que hayan de reformarse, debiendo ratificarse por la subsiguiente legislatura ordinaria, por igual número de votos, para que entre en vigencia.

ARTICULO 374.- No podrán reformarse, en ningún caso, el artículo anterior, el presente artículo, los artículos constitucionales que se refieren a la forma de gobierno, al territorio nacional, al período presidencial, a la prohibición para ser nuevamente Presidente de la República, el ciudadano que lo haya desempeñado bajo cualquier título y el referente a quienes no pueden ser Presidentes de la República por el período subsiguiente.

CAPITULO II
DE LA INVIOLABILIDAD DE LA CONSTITUCIÓN

ARTICULO 375.- Esta Constitución no pierde su vigencia ni deja de cumplirse por acto de fuerza o cuando fuere supuestamente derogada o modificada por cualquier otro medio y procedimiento distintos del que ella mismo dispone. En estos casos, todo ciudadano investido o no de autoridad, tiene el deber de colaborar en el mantenimiento o restablecimiento de su afectiva vigencia.
Serán juzgados, según esta misma constitución y las leyes expedidas en conformidad con ella, los responsables de los hechos señalados en la primera parte del párrafo anterior, lo mismo que los principales funcionarios de los gobiernos que se organicen subsecuentemente, si no han contribuido a restablecer inmediatamente el imperio de esta Constitución y a las autoridades constituidas conforme a ella. El Congreso puede decretar con el voto de la mayoría absoluta de sus miembros, la incautación de todo o parte de los bienes de esas mismas personas y de quienes se hayan enriquecido al amparo de la suplantación.